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I. INTRODUCTION
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is an inter-
national treaty which was created on April 24, 1963.1 The
United States became a party to the treaty when the U.S. Sen-
ate ratified it on December 24, 1969.2 Under Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention, if a foreign national is arrested, the author-
ities must give the foreigner the option to notify his consulate of
his detention.3
t J.D., Pace University School of Law, cum laude. B.A., Villanova Univer-
sity, summa cum laude, Phi Betta Kappa, History and Political Science; I would
like to give a very special thank you to my friends and family for their unwavering
support. I would also like to give a special thank you to the Honorable Lisa Mar-
garet Smith for her initial guidance and direction.
1 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR], available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/
consul.htm.
2 See Amnesty Int'l, United States of America: A Time for Action - Protecting
the Consular Rights of Foreign Nationals Facing the Death Penalty, AI Index AMR
51/106/2001, Aug. 22, 2001, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/en-
gamr511062001.
3 See VCCR, supra note 1. Article 36(1)(b) provides:
if [the accused] so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State
1
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Although the United States is a signatory of the Vienna
Convention, it has repeatedly failed to adhere to the law set
forth by the Convention. In both U.S. state and federal criminal
courts, foreign nationals have been denied their right to notify
their consulate of their detention. Since the death penalty was
reinstituted in 1976 by the United States Supreme Court in
Gregg v. Georgia,4 there have been twenty-one executions of for-
eign nationals as of May 15, 2004.5 Of the twenty-one men exe-
cuted, sixteen of them raised the claim of a violation of their
rights under the Vienna Convention. 6 The failure of the United
States to enforce the Vienna Convention led various nations of
the world to bring suit against the United States of America at
the International Court of Justice ("ICJ").7 In lawsuits brought
by Germany and Mexico, the ICJ ruled that the United States
violated international law by failing to notify detained foreign
nationals of their right to consular notification.8 After each de-
if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or com-
mitted to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other
manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person
arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the
said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the per-
son concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph. Id.
As stated, the detainee has the option of accepting aid from his consulate. Further
Article 36(1)(c) provides:
consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending
State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond
with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have
the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, cus-
tody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment. Neverthe-
less, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a
national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes
such action. Id.
4 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (addressing capital punishment im-
posed for murder convictions).
5 See Foreign Nationals Part H, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglarticle.php?
scid=31&did=582#executed (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
6 See id.
7 Paraguay, Germany and Mexico have all brought suits against the United
States. While Germany and Mexico obtained a final judgment from the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Paraguay withdrew its claim, asking the court to dismiss
the case with prejudice. See Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions- Order- Discontinuance (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 4 (Nov. 10) (Paraguay
Discontinuance), available at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipaus-
frame.htm.
8 See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 3 (June 27) (LaGrand),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm. See also
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cision by the ICJ, the United States repeatedly pledged to rem-
edy its violations. 9 However, the remedies put into place by the
United States attempt to only remedy cases in which violations
have already occurred. 10 This Comment proposes that the insti-
tuted remedies should also be aimed at preventing future viola-
tions of the Vienna Convention from occurring in the courts of
the United States.
This Comment searches for a way to prevent violations of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations from occurring
continuously in U.S. courts. In order to find an effective way to
eliminate this problem, one must first understand the complex
history and cases underlying the problem. Part II will follow
the progression of three cases that made their way from the
U.S. courts to the ICJ. This section will look at how the U.S.
courts barred all of the defendants' claims and also how the
countries of Paraguay, Germany and Mexico each brought suit
against the United States in the ICJ for violation of the Vienna
Convention. Further, this section will set forth the remedies
proposed in these ICJ decisions. Next, Part III will explore the
remedies that the United States had in place prior to the ICJ
decisions, and the remedies that were implemented in response
to those decisions. Additionally, this section will show why the
remedies implemented by the United States are not sufficient to
stop further violations of the Vienna Convention in the U.S.
courts. Next, Part IV will introduce the current policy and ex-
plain why it is ineffective. Lastly, Part V will propose a solution
which will enable full compliance with the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations in the future, thus eliminating this prob-
lem from U.S. courts.
II. BACKGROUND
In June of 1993, Angel Breard was convicted for the at-
tempted rape and murder of Ruth Dickie and was sentenced to
death.'1 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia af-
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
12 (Mar. 31) (Avena), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imus-
frame.htm.
9 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3; see also Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12.
10 See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12 110.
11 See Breard v. Virginia, 445 S.E.2d 670, 673 (Va. 1994).
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firmed the judgment one year later. 12 On August 30, 1996,
Breard filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 13 In
his habeas, Breard argued for the first time that, due to viola-
tions of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,' 4 his
conviction should be overturned.15
Breard argued that as a citizen of Paraguay, he was enti-
tled to notify the Paraguayan Consulate about his arrest in or-
der to obtain their assistance. 16 The judge rejected his claim,
holding that because Breard failed to raise the violation of the
Vienna Convention anywhere in the state court proceedings, his
claim was procedurally barred.' 7 In addition, because Breard
failed to demonstrate any cause or prejudice for this procedural
default, his claim was dismissed.' 8
Approximately one month prior to the district court's deci-
sion in September of 1996, the Republic of Paraguay, its U.S.
Ambassador and Paraguay's Consul General to the United
States collectively brought a claim against various Virginia
state officials to free Breard based on a U.S. violation of the Vi-
enna Convention. 19 This time, the district court dismissed the
suit due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 20 In its deci-
sion, the court noted that although the Eleventh Amendment
generally bars suits by foreign governments against state gov-
ernments,21 there is a narrowly crafted exception under Ex
Parte Young.22 However, in order to satisfy the exception, the
plaintiffs needed to show a "continuing violation of federal
law."23 Since the plaintiffs, once they were notified,24 were al-
12 See id.
13 See Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996).
14 See VCCR, supra note 1.
15 See Netherland, 949 F. Supp. at 1260.
16 See id.
17 See id. at 1263.
18 See id.
19 See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1996).
20 See id. at 1271.
21 See id. at 1272 (citing Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 82
(1996); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)).
22 See Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1272 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908)).
23 Id. (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1986)).
24 The Paraguayan Consulate did not learn about Breard's arrest and trial
until some time in 1996. See Application of the Republic of Paraguay (Para. v.
[Vol. 18:343
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lowed access to Breard, they could not claim a "continuing viola-
tion of federal law."25 Although District Court Judge Richard
Williams was "disenchanted by Virginia's failure to embrace
and abide by the principles embodied in the Vienna Conven-
tion," he nonetheless found the Republic of Paraguay's claim to
be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 26 After the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Breard's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, 27 Breard, along with Paraguay, peti-
tioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and a stay
of execution.28
Meanwhile, a few days prior to the commencement of
Breard v. Greene before the U.S. Supreme Court, Paraguay filed
suit against the United States in the ICJ.29 In this suit, Para-
guay claimed that a violation of the Vienna Convention on Con-
sular relations had taken place. 30 Paraguay requested that
Breard's execution date of April 14, 1998 be stayed until the
conclusion of this proceeding.3 1 Furthermore, Paraguay asked
the International Court to order a retrial for Breard, this time
with the aid of the Paraguayan consulate.3 2 On April 9, the In-
ternational Court issued a unanimous Provisional Measure
stating that the "United States should take all measures at its
disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed
pending the final decision in these proceedings."33
Back in the United States, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Virginia district court, agreeing with that court's
U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 12 (Apr. 3), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
ipaus/ipausframe.htm, (Paraguay Application). See also GAYL WESTERMAN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 105 (2004) [hereinafter WEST-
ERMAN] (using Jonathan I. Charney & W. Michael Reisman, AGORA: BREARD:
The Facts 92 A.J.I.L. 666 (Oct. 1998)).
25 Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1273.
26 Id.
27 See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998).
28 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
29 Paraguay Application, 1998 I.C.J. T 12.
30 Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations - Order - Re-
quest for Provisional Measures (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 1, 2 (Apr. 9), (Para-
guay Order), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.
htm.
31 See id. 5, 8(a).
32 See id. 5(2)
33 Id. 41.
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finding that Breard's claim was procedurally defaulted. 34 The
Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim that the Vienna Con-
vention, as a treaty, fell under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, 35 thus superceding the state proce-
dural default doctrine. 36 First, the Court held that the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 37
which was enacted in 1996, modified the Vienna Convention be-
cause it was created "later in time."38 Second, the Court fol-
lowed Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention, which stated that
Article 36 obligations "shall be exercised in conformity with the
laws and regulations of the receiving State."39 The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that because Breard's claim would be proce-
durally defaulted under State law, he could not raise this claim
in his federal habeas review. 40
By declining to implement the ICJ's Provisional Measures,
and holding that Breard's claim was procedurally barred, the
U.S. Supreme Court eliminated all but one remedy for Angel
Breard.41 The Governor of Virginia now had the ability to grant
either a stay of execution or remove Breard from death row
under the Governor's executive clemency power.42 Justice Sou-
ter acknowledged that "[i]f the Governor wishes to wait for the
34 See Greene, 523 U.S. at 375.
35 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land .. " Id.
36 See Greene, 523 U.S. at 375.
37 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) states that if
a petitioner fails to raise a violation of a treaty in the state court proceedings, then
the doctrine of procedural default applies. AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(e)(2)
(2005).
38 Greene, 523 U.S. at 376 (citing Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888)) (holding that if a treaty and a federal statute conflict, "the one last in date
will control the other").
39 Id. at 375 (quoting VCCR, supra note 1). The full text of Article 36(2)
states:
The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to
the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full
effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
article are intended.
See VCCR, supra note 1.
40 See Greene, 523 U.S. at 376.
41 See id. at 378.
42 See Greene, 523 U.S. at 378.
[Vol. 18:343
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decision of the ICJ that is his prerogative. But nothing in our
existing case law allows us to make that choice for him."43 De-
spite a last effort by the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright,
to stay Breard's execution, 44 Governor James Gilmore denied
the stay,45 as the dissenting justices in Breard v. Green had ar-
gued for,46 and Angel Breard was executed. 47 After Breard's ex-
ecution, the United States formally apologized to Paraguay for
an "unquestionabl[e] . . . violation of an obligation owed to the
Government of Paraguay."48 Paraguay accepted the apology,
praising "the courage of the U.S. government in admitting an
error."49 On November 2, 1998, Paraguay discontinued its suit,
with prejudice, against the United States and requested that
the case be removed from the Court.50
While litigation on Angel Breard's case continued, another
case brought the issue of consular notification to the attention
of the U.S. courts. In 1982 Karl and Walter LaGrand, two
brothers of German nationality, robbed a bank and were ar-
rested in Arizona for "first-degree murder, attempted murder
in the first degree, attempted armed robbery and two counts of
kidnapping."5 1 The two men were convicted of all charges and
sentenced to death. 52 Karl and Walter's convictions were af-
43 Id.
44 On April 13, 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote to Virginia
Governor Jim Gilmore asking him to stay the execution of Angel Breard for "the
unique and difficult foreign policy issues." Charney & Reisman, supra note 24, at
671-72. (quoting letter from Madeleine Albright to governor of Virginia who
stressed her concern for Americans living and traveling abroad).
45 On April 14, 1998, Governor Gilmore denied Breard's request for executive
clemency, stating that his duty was to the people of Virginia and that the "Interna-
tional Court of Justice has no authority to intervene in the criminal justice system
of the Commonwealth of Virginia or any other state. . . ." Id. at 674 (quoting Vir-
ginia Governor Jim Gilmore's Press Release (Apr. 14, 1998)).
46 Greene, 523 U.S. at 376 (Stevens, J., Breyer, J., dissenting).
47 United States of America: The Execution of Angel Breard: Apologies Are Not
Enough, May 1, 1998, available at http:/lweb.amnesty.org/library/index/engAMR
510271998.
48 Paraguay and USA Resolve Dispute over Breard Execution, March 1999, in
Foreign Nationals: Current Issues and News, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ar-
ticle.php?scid=31&did=579.
49 Id.
50 See Paraguay Discontinuance, 1998 I.C.J. 4.
51 State v. LaGrand (Karl), 733 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Ariz. 1987); State v.
LaGrand (Walter), 734 P.2d 563, 565 (Ariz. 1987).
52 See LaGrand (Karl), 733 P.2d at 1067; LaGrand (Walter), 734 P.2d at 565.
2006] 349
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firmed by the Arizona Supreme Court.53 After unsuccessful at-
tempts to seek post-conviction relief in the Arizona State court
system, the Supreme Court also denied them relief.5 4 The
LaGrand brothers subsequently filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to the district court in Arizona. 55 The district
court acknowledged that Arizona failed to notify the LaGrand
brothers of their rights under the Vienna Convention, neverthe-
less, mirroring the Virginia district court in Breard, the Arizona
district court found the claim to be procedurally defaulted be-
cause it was not raised during the state court proceedings. 56
The court stated further that the only way it could address vio-
lations of the Vienna Convention was if the petitioners could
show cause or prejudice. 57 Karl and Walter each attempted to
show cause.58 Karl argued that his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel was violated,59 while Walter
stated various claims.60
Karl argued that his trial attorney was ineffective.6 1 How-
ever, he had two other lawyers during his state court proceed-
ings (one on appeal and another for his collateral appeal),
neither of whom raised his Vienna Convention claim. 62 The
court reasoned that because Karl's two unquestionably compe-
tent attorneys could have, but did not raise the violation of the
Vienna Convention claim during either the direct or the collat-
eral appeal, this claim was meritless.63 Karl's brother, Walter,
could not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim be-
53 See id.
54 See LaGrand v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991).
55 See LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 451 (D. Ariz. 1995).
56 See id. at 454.
57 See id. at 454-55.
58 See id. at 457, 466.
59 See id. at 457; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to... have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense."); see also LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1271 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (stating that the Sixth
Amendment grants all defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel)).
60 See Lewis, 883 F. Supp. at 466-69 (Walter had three arguments: the trial
court erred when it ruled that Karl's confessions were inadmissible, the Arizona
felony murder statute was unconstitutional because it did not have a lesser in-
cluded offense and that mitigating evidence was not taken into consideration by
the sentencing court.).
61 See id. at 457.
62 See LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1262 (9th Cir. 1998).
63 See id.
[Vol. 18:343350
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cause he had waived his right to do So. 6 4 Subsequent attempts
by the two brothers failed as the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court both affirmed the district court's denial of the habeas
corpus. 65 Karl LaGrand's execution was carried out on Febru-
ary 24, 1999.66
After Karl's execution, Jane Dee Hull, the Governor of Ari-
zona, denied Walter LaGrand's bid for executive clemency.67
Germany, which had been notified of the situations of Karl and
Walter LaGrand in 1992,68 finally intervened and attempted to
stop the execution of Walter LaGrand. On March 2, 1999, the
day before Walter LaGrand's scheduled execution, Germany
filed a suit against the United Sates of America in the ICJ.69
The following day, only hours before Walter was to be put to
death, the court issued Provisional Measures, similar to those
issued in Paraguay's suit one year earlier, ordering that "[t]he
United States of America should take all measures at its dispo-
sal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the
final decision in these proceedings. '70
After the Provisional Measure of the ICJ, Germany then
filed suit against the United States and Governor Hull in the
U.S. Supreme Court, attempting to place an injunction on Wal-
ter LaGrand's execution.71 Germany sought to enforce the Pro-
visional Measure of the ICJ upon the United States.72 The
Supreme Court, citing Breard v. Greene,73 dismissed the com-
plaint due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.7 4 Further-
64 See id.
65 See id. at 1269.
66 See Foreign Nationals Part II, supra note 5.
67 WESTERMAN, supra note 24, at 126 (using the Statement of Governor Jane
Dee Hull on the Case of Walter LaGrand, Mar. 2, 1999).
68 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 23.
69 Application of the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J.
(Mar. 2), available at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
70 Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations - Order - Re-
quest for Provisional Measures (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 1 (Mar. 2), Y 8, availa-
ble at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
71 See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111
(1999).
72 See id. at 111-12.
73 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
74 See Federal Republic of Germany, 526 U.S. at 112; see also Allen, 949 F.
Supp. 1269 at 1272. As previously stated, the Eleventh Amendment grants states
sovereign immunity and therefore cannot be sued by foreign governments. Be-
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more, the Court added that the lateness of Germany's response
to the situation was a contributing factor in the Court's deci-
sion.75 "This action was filed within only two hours of a sched-
uled execution that was ordered on January 15, 1999, based
upon a sentence imposed by Arizona in 1984, about which the
Federal Republic of Germany learned in 1992."76 With the U.S.
Supreme Court's approval, Governor Hull ignored the Provi-
sional Measure of the ICJ and went against the advice of the
Arizona Clemency Board, 77 by putting Walter LaGrange to
death by gas chamber on March 3, 1999.78
Unlike Paraguay, who removed their claim from the Inter-
national Court once the United States formally apologized and
Angel Breard was put to death,7 9 Germany refused to accept the
United States' formal apology80 and awaited the decision of the
International Court.8 1 In June of 2001, the ICJ released its de-
cision. 2 The Court found the United States in violation of its
international legal obligations by failing to notify the LaGrand
brothers and Germany of each party's respective rights under
the Vienna Convention. 3 The Court then added that Article
36(1) created individual rights in foreign nationals and those
rights may be invoked by the "national State of the detained
person."8 4 In addition, the Court held that the United States
cause Arizona is immune from suit, the court lacks the jurisdiction to hear the
case. Id.
75 See Federal Republic of Germany, 526 U.S. at 112.
76 Id.
77 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 I 113 (the Arizona Clemency Board recom-
mended that Walter LaGrand be granted a stay of execution).
78 See Suarez Execution Strains Foreign Relations, Aug. 2002, in Foreign Na-
tionals: Current Issues and News (citing Ginger Thompson, Texas Executes a Mexi-
can for Murder Despite President Fox's Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, at A5),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=579; see also Foreign
Nationals Part 1I, supra note 5.
79 See Paraguay Discontinuance, 1998 I.C.J. 4 (Nov. 10).
80 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 122 ([v]iolations of Article 36 followed by
death sentences and executions cannot be remedied by apologies or the distribu-
tion of leaflets. An effective remedy requires certain changes in U.S. law and
practice).
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 Id. 91 128(3).
84 See id. 77. The issue of whether the Vienna Convention on Consular Re-
lations created individual rights was expressly denied in Allen. "[Tihe term
"self-executing" also denotes a treaty that confers rights of action on private indi-
viduals. Defendants correctly note that the Vienna Convention and the Friendship
[Vol. 18:343
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violated its Order granting the Provisional Measure of staying
the execution of Walter LaGrand until the International Court
was able to deliver a judgment.8 5 Furthermore, the Interna-
tional Court ruled that state procedural default rules by them-
selves do not violate the Vienna Convention.8 6 However, in
circumstances where the state procedural default rules prevent
a court from considering a violation of the Vienna Convention,
the state procedural default rules conflict with, and thus vio-
late, the Vienna Convention.8 7 Finally, in terms of future
breaches of the Vienna Convention, the ICJ held that if at any
time the United States breaches its Article 36(1) obligations, "it
would be incumbent upon the United States to allow the review
and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking ac-
count of the violation of the rights set forth in the Conven-
tion." 8 The Court added that the United States could choose
whatever method of "review and reconsideration" it wanted.8 9
This judgment by the ICJ, especially its decision that Arti-
cle 36(1) created individual rights, was met with mixed reviews
by the U.S. courts. 90 Pursuant to the LaGrand decision by the
International Court, the United States implemented a "review
and reconsideration" for all death penalty cases where Article
36 violations occurred. 91 Specifically, the method of "review
and reconsideration" that the United States implemented was
that of executive clemency, "an institution 'deeply rooted in the
Treaty are not "self-executing" in this sense." Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1274 (citing
Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.3d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1988)); but see Greene, 523 U.S. at 376 ("arguably confers on an individual the
right to consular assistance following arrest").
85 See id. 128(5).
86 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 91.
87 See id.
88 Id. 125.
89 See id. 125, 128(7).
90 Compare Valdez v. Oklahoma, 46 P.3d 703, 709 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002)
([flor this court to decide that the ICJ's ruling overrules a binding decision of the
United States Supreme Court and affords a judicial remedy to an individual for a
violation of the Convention it would interfere with the nation's foreign affairs and
run afoul of the U.S. Constitution), with United States ex rel. Madej v. Schoming,
No. 98-C1866, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20170, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2002) (after
LaGrand, however, no court can credibly hold that the Vienna Convention does not
create individually enforceable rights).
91 See A Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals - Order - Re-
quest for Provisional Measures (Mex. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 3, 30 (Feb. 5) (Avena
Order), available at http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm.
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Anglo-American system of justice."' 92 Although the United
States, through efforts by the Department of State, has been
working on ways to improve compliance with the Vienna Con-
vention, 93 foreign nationals continue to be denied their right to
consular notification.94
Currently, there are more Mexican nationals on death row
than any other nationality. 95 As of August 15, 2004, fifty-three
of the 117 foreign nationals on death row in the United States
were Mexican nationals. 96 Despite the efforts of Mexican offi-
cials over the years to enforce the rights of their nationals, more
Mexicans have been executed in the United States than any
other nationality.97 The most recent example is Javier Suarez
Medina. Medina, a Mexican national, was executed on August
14, 2002, despite the attempt by Mexican President Vicente Fox
to stay the execution. 98 Medina was the fourth Mexican exe-
cuted in the United States since the death penalty was reinsti-
tuted in 1976. 99 Since the United States "consistently refused
to provide relief adequate to put an end to these violations and
to ensure Mexico that they will not reoccur in the future," 00
Mexico filed suit against the United States in the ICJ on Janu-
92 Id. 44.
93 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 121 (according to the United States, it is esti-
mated that until now over 60,000 copies of the brochure as well as over 400,000
copies of the pocket card have been distributed to federal, state and local law en-
forcement and judicial officials throughout the United States).
94 See Foreign Nationals Part 11, supra note 5.
95 See Consular Rights, Foreign Nationals and the Death Penalty, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=198&scid=3 1#background.
96 See id.
97 See William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Re-
cent Developments, (ACLU Int'l Civil Liberties Report 2002), Jan. 31, 2003, at 44,
45, available at http://sdshh.com/ICLR/ICLR_2002/7_Aceves.pdf, see also Foreign
Nationals Part II, supra note 5.
98 See Foreign Nationals Part 1I, supra note 5; see also Mexican Officials
Claim Execution of Foreign National is Illegal, Foreign Nationals: Current Issues
and News (citing Mexican Government Prepared to Take Death Row Case to U.S.
Supreme Court, Assoc. PRESS, Aug. 13, 2002), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ar-
ticle.php?scid=31&did=579 (in a letter sent to Texas Governor Rick Perry prior to
the execution, Mexican President Vicente Fox called on the state to halt the execu-
tion, saying the punishment is "illegal" because it violates the 1963 Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations).
99 See Foreign Nationals Part II, supra note 5; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 177 (1976).
100 Avena Order, 2001 I.C.J. 3 % 5.
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ary 9, 2003.101 The suit was on behalf of the fifty-four Mexican
nationals awaiting the death penalty.10 2
In its application, Mexico asked for the "status quo ante,1 °3
meaning that Mexico wanted retrials for all of their nationals
who were convicted because of the U.S. violations of the Vienna
Convention. 10 4 In addition, Mexico argued that the United
States was under an international obligation not to apply the
doctrine of procedural default to any Article 36 claims. 10 5 More-
over, the United States "must take the steps necessary and suf-
ficient to establish a meaningful remedy at law" for violations of
Article 36.106 Mexico also addressed its three nationals who
were scheduled to be executed within the next six months and
requested that the International Court order their executions
stayed. 107
The International Court of Justice reached its decision on
the Order to enforce Provisional Measures on February 5,
2003.108 The Court found in favor of Mexico holding that the
United States "shall take all measures necessary to ensure that
Mr. C6sar Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno Ramos
101 See Application of the United Mexican States (Mex. v. U.S.) 2003 I.C.J. 128
(Jan. 9), (Avena Application), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/
imus/imusorder/imus-application_20030109.PDF.
102 Originally, when Mexico brought this action, on January 9, 2003, before the
International Court the number of Mexican nationals on death row was fifty-four.
However, on January 11, 2003, Governor George Ryan of Illinois, commuted all of
the death sentences in Illinois. By doing this, Governor Ryan commuted three of
the fifty-four Mexicans on death row: Juan Alonso Caballero Hernandez, Gabriel
Solache Romero and Mario Flores Urbano. In response, Mexico informed the ICJ
in a letter dated January 20, 2003, that it would withdraw its request for provi-
sional measures on behalf of the three Mexican nationals who had their death
sentences commuted. See Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Clemency for All; Ryan
Commutes Death Sentences to Life in Prison Without Parole: 'There is no Honorable
Way to Kill," He Says, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 12, 2003, at Cl; see also Foreign
Nationals Part III, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=583
#innocence; Press Release, International Court of Justice, Request for Indication of
Provisional Measures: Summary of Order, 2003/9bis (Feb. 5. 2003), available at
http://www.icj-icj.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2003/presscom2003-09bismus_20
030205.htm.
103 Avena Application, 2003 I.C.J. 128 281(1).
104 See Aceves, supra note 97, at 45.
105 See Avena Application, 2003 I.C.J. 128 281(3); see also Avena Order, 2003
I.C.J. 2 8(3).
106 See Avena Application, 2003 I.C.J. 128 281(3).
107 See Aceves, supra note 97 at 46; see also Avena Order, 2003 I.C.J. 2 f 11.
108 See Avena Order, 2003 I.C.J. 2.
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and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera' 0 9 are not executed pending
final judgment in these proceedings." 110 Additionally, the Court
held that the "Government of the United States of America
shall inform the Court of all measures taken in implementation
of this Order."111
In the Order to enforce Provisional Measures, Mexico clari-
fied the meaning of its request that the United States establish
a "meaningful remedy at law" for violations of Article 36.112
Mexico stated that an apology from the United States was not
sufficient; 113 nor was executive clemency, the remedy the
United States put in place at the request of Germany and the
ICJ during the LaGrand decision,114 a sufficient remedy.' 15
Both of these remedies, Mexico argued, failed to comply with
that the "review and reconsideration" standard set forth in the
LaGrand case.' 16 Moreover, although Mexico conceded that the
United States had the choice of how to comply with the "review
and reconsideration" standard set in LaGrand, Mexico wanted
the International Court to "leave no doubt as to the required
result."1 17
On March 31, 2004, the ICJ delivered its nonappealable,
binding judgment on the matter."l 8 The Court affirmed that
the United States was in violation of the Vienna Convention for
its failure to notify the detainees of their rights under Article
36(1).119 The ICJ also affirmed its position from previous cases
109 Osvaldo Torres Aguilera was eventually granted executive clemency by the
governor of Oklahoma on May 13, 2004. See Foreign Nationals Part III, supra note
102.
110 Avena Order, 2003 I.C.J. 2 59(a).
111 Avena Order, 2003 I.C.J. 2 59(b).
112 See Avena Application, 2003 I.C.J. 128 281(3).
113 See Avena Order, 2003 I.C.J. 2 1$ 7, 27; Our Opinion: Compliance with
Hague Ruling Protects Americans Abroad, MIAIi HERALD, Apr. 4, 2004, reprinted
in Recent Editorials on the March 2004 Decision by the International Court of Jus-
tice, available at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=955.
114 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3.
115 See Avena Order, 2003 I.C.J. 2 91 45 ("the standardless, secretive and unre-
viewable process that is called clemency cannot and does not satisfy this Court's
mandate [in the LaGrand case]").
116 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3.
117 See id. 15 (this meant that Mexico wanted the ICJ to specify to the United
States what methods of review and reconsideration were adequate and which
methods were not adequate).
118 See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12
119 See id. 9T 153(4).
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that the United States shall be the final arbiter in choosing the
proper method of review and reconsideration for violations of
the Vienna Convention. 120
In response to the decision made by the ICJ, President Vi-
cente Fox met with U.S. President George W. Bush in April of
2004.121 At the meeting, the two presidents discussed the next
possible steps that the U.S. courts could take to remedy the con-
tinual violations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. 122 De-
spite acknowledgement by President Bush that the United
States has indeed continued to violate the Vienna Convention,
many states have dismissed the ruling of the ICJ altogether. 123
III. CURRENT REMEDIES
Currently, there are two ways in which a party can seek
relief for a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Re-
lations.1 24 The first way to get relief is through the U.S.
courts.1 25 However, obtaining a remedy through the judicial
process is difficult because the Vienna Convention is silent on
120 See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12 153(9).
121 See President Bush Acknowledges Importance of World Court Ruling Re-
garding Mexican Foreign Nationals, Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 13, 2004 reprinted in For-
eign Nationals: Current Issues and News, available at http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/article.php?scid=31&did=579.
122 See id.
123 See, e.g., No Justice in Rights Denied, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2004, reprinted in
Recent Editorials on the March 2004 Decision by the International Court of Justice,
available at http://deathpenaltyinfo.orgarticle.php?scid=31&did=955; but see
Oklahoma Governor Grants Clemency to Mexican National, THE OKLAHOMAN, May
14, 2004, reprinted in Foreign Nationals: Current Issues and News, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgarticle.php?scid=31&did=579 (Oklahoma Gover-
nor Brad Henry commuted the sentence of Osvaldo Torres to life imprisonment
without parole. In coming to this decision, the Governor noted the binding effect
the ICJ has on U.S. courts and that "[tihe treaty (VCCR) is also important to pro-
tecting the rights of American citizens abroad." Even if Governor Henry had not
granted Torres' plea for clemency, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals de-
cided earlier that day to stay Torres' execution and order a new hearing in his case.
Appeals court Judge Chapel wrote, "I have concluded that there is a possibility a
significant miscarriage of justice occurred, as shown by Torres' claims, specifically
that the violation of his Vienna Convention rights contributed to trial counsel's
ineffectiveness, that the jury did not hear significant evidence, and the results of
the trial is unreliable.").
124 See Avena Order, 2003 I.C.J. 2 1 37.
125 See id.
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the topic of remedies 126 and the United States Supreme Court
has not ruled on the issue. 127 Many Article 36 claims are proce-
durally defaulted, which denies defendants the ability to obtain
relief. The second way to obtain relief is through a grant of ex-
ecutive clemency.128 This method is inconsistent, thus failing to
meet the expectations set by the ICJ in LaGrand 29 and
Avena. 130 Therefore, although there are currently remedies
available to foreign nationals, they are not "meaningful
remed[ies] at law."' 31
A. Relief Through the Courts
Prior to the ICJ's LaGrand decision,1 32 American courts
were unable to come to a definite conclusion on the issue of indi-
vidual rights. Since its ratification, the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations was considered by the United States to be a
self-executing treaty.133 This, however, did not necessarily
mean that it automatically granted enforceable individual
rights. 34 The Virginia district court in Paraguay v. Allen, 35
stated that "[tihe term 'self-executing' has two distinct mean-
ings in international law." 36 The first meaning is that the
treaty does not require Congress to implement further legisla-
tion in order to make the treaty federal law. 37 In Allen, al-
though both parties agreed that the Vienna Convention met
this first interpretation, neither side agreed on the second inter-
pretation of the term "self-executing." This second meaning
126 See VCCR, supra note 1, at pmbl. ("Realizing that the purpose of such priv-
ileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient per-
formance of functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective States...
127 See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
128 See Avena Order, 2003 I.C.J. 2 37.
129 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 125, 128(7).
130 See Avena Order, 2003 I.C.J. 2 8(3).
131 See id.
132 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 77.
133 See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J., concur-
ring) ("The Vienna Convention is a self executing treaty-it provides rights to indi-
viduals rather than merely setting out the obligations of signatories"); see also
Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996).
134 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 111 cmt. h (1987).
135 See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1996).
136 Id. at 1274 (citing Comm. of United States Citizens in Nicar., 859 F.3d at
937).
137 See id.
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conferred individual rights under the treaty to private par-
ties. 138 The district court in Virginia ruled against Paraguay,
holding that the Vienna Convention did not grant such
rights. 139 However, the conclusion in Allen appears to be the
minority opinion since many of the lower federal courts have
been willing to entertain the idea that the Vienna Convention
grants rights to the individual. 140 Even the U.S. Supreme
Court has favored such a conclusion. In Breard v. Greene,14 1
the Court stated that the Vienna Convention "arguably confers
on an individual the right to consular assistance following
arrest."14
2
After the LaGrand decision in 2001,143 some courts contin-
ued to ignore the ICJ's decision, holding that the Vienna Con-
vention did not provide individuals with rights. 144 Other courts
however, felt that this decision by the ICJ mandated them to
find that the Convention granted individual rights. 145 Although
some courts, 146 including the Supreme Court in Greene,147
138 Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1274 (citing Comm. of United States Citizens in Ni-
car., 859 F.3d at 937).
139 See id.
140 See, e.g., United States v. Salas, No. 98-4374, 1998 WL 911731, at * 3 (4th
Cir. Dec. 31, 1998); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 142 F.3d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998) ("So
far as relevant here, Article 36 of the Convention requires a detaining state to
inform a detained foreign national of his right to consult with consulate officials.");
Breard v. Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1263 (E.D. Va. 1996); Faulder v. John-
son, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F.
Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp.
2d 1122, 1125 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
141 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
142 Id. at 376.
143 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3.
144 See e.g., United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2001) (hold-
ing that Article 36 does not create individually enforceable rights); United States
v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 389 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 907, cmt. a (1987) ("International agreements, even
those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or
provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts ...")); United States v.
Bustos de la Pava, 268 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Nai Fook Li, 206
F.3d 56, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2000); New Mexico v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d 267,
274 (N.M. 2001).
145 See Schomig, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20170 at *3 ("After LaGrand, however,
no court can credibly hold that the Vienna Convention does not create individually
enforceable rights.").
146 See United States v. Salas, No. 98-4374, 1998 WL 911731, at * 3 (4th Cir.
Dec. 31, 1998); Villafuerte v. Stewart, 142 F.3d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998); Nether-
land, 949 F. Supp. at 1263; Johnson, 81 F.3d at 520; United States v. Hon-
17
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seemingly agreed with the ICJ's decision that the Vienna Con-
vention creates individual rights, as stated in LaGrand,148 de-
fendants still were unable to obtain relief because they were
failing to abide by the procedural default doctrine, as stated in
AEDPA,149 which mandated that their claim originate in state
court. 150
The Supreme Court proclaimed in Breard that violations of
the Vienna Convention would be procedurally barred under
AEDPA 151 if the claims were not brought during the state court
proceedings. 152  The Court further stated that "even [if]
Breard's Vienna Convention claim [was] properly raised and
proven, it is extremely doubtful that the violation should result
in the overturning of a final judgment of conviction without
some showing that the violation had an effect on the trial."'
53
Thus, in order to obtain relief from a Vienna Convention viola-
tion, the defendants have the burden of establishing not only
that their rights under the Vienna Convention were violated,
but also that the violation materially prejudiced either the out-
come of their trial, or the sentence they received.' 54
The courts have placed a high burden on the defendant to
establish prejudice, thereby creating a very limited possibility
for remedy in the courts. 155 Prejudice requires that the defen-
dant produce evidence that he was not aware of his Vienna Con-
vention rights, that he would have taken advantage of his
rights had he known of their existence, and that it was likely
that the communication with the consulate would have assisted
him.' 56 In United States v. Alvarado-Torres,57 the defendant
gla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v.
Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
147 See Greene, 523 U.S. at 371.
148 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 77.
149 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C.S.
§ 2254(e)(2) (2005).
150 See Greene, 523 U.S. at 376; Schoming, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20170, at *3.
151 See AEDPA 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(e)(2).
152 See Greene, 523 U.S. at 375-76 (citing AEDPA 28 U.S.C.S. 28 § 2254(e)(2)).
153 Id. at 377.
154 See Schomig, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20170 at *5.
155 See United States v. Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (S.D. Cal.
1999).
156 See id. (citing United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592, 594-95 (9th Cir.
1992)).
157 Id.
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sought to suppress incriminating information that she gave to
the agents because the information was solicited in violation of
the Vienna Convention. 158 The court determined that the
agent's failure to inform the defendant of her rights under the
Vienna Convention was not prejudicial and therefore refused to
suppress the evidence. 159 In addition, the court failed to find
prejudice when the agents interrogated the defendant prior to
notifying her consulate. 160
The Alvarado-Torres court went on to say that even if the
defendant could establish prejudice, suppression would not be
the appropriate remedy. 161 This is because the exclusionary
rule 162 is a remedy that is available only for constitutional vio-
lations.163 The court cited to Murphy v. Netherland, 16 4 in which
the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the Vienna Convention
does not create fundamental, Constitutional rights. 165 Also,
noting the Chaparro-Alcantara case, the court stated that sup-
pression could not be a remedy because the Vienna Convention
did not expressly provide it as a remedy for violation of its
terms.166 Moreover, the Alvarado-Torres court held that a dis-
missal of the indictment would not be a proper remedy either
because "this Court is not aware of any decision in which the
Ninth Circuit has suggested that dismissal of the indictment
would provide an appropriate remedy for a violation of the Vi-
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See id. at 991; cf. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (showing
that even an affidavit from the Mexican Consul in St. Louis, stating that if the
defendants had contacted him, he would have told them not to provide any infor-
mation to the I.N.S., was insufficient to meet the threshold of prejudice because
the defendants failed to show that they would not have waived their Fifth Amend-
ment rights prior to speaking with the Consulate).
161 See Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 993-94.
162 A rule that excludes or suppresses evidence obtained in violation of an ac-
cused person's constitutional rights. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
163 Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 994 (citing Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964) (dealing with the Sixth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (dealing with the Fourth Amendment); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S.
532 (1897) (dealing with the Fifth Amendment)).
164 Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997).
165 Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 994 (citing Netherland, 116 F.3d at 100
(stating that although the Convention may create individual rights, a state does
not violate a constitutional right merely by violating the Vienna Convention)).
166 Id. (citing Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1125-26).
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enna Convention."167 Therefore, the Court denied the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss.168 The court voiced its concern over
the continuing failure by the United States to abide by the
terms of the Vienna Convention. 69 Furthermore, the court
stated that although there was a lack of remedies available for
violations of the Vienna Convention, the court was powerless to
create any such remedy. 7 0
B. Relief Through Executive Clemency
Due to the limited relief granted in the courts, it is fortu-
nate for defendants that the courts are not the only place where
a defendant can receive a remedy from a violation of the Vienna
Convention. As a result of the International Court's 2001 deci-
sion in LaGrand,171 the United States was given the option to
choose its own method of "review and reconsideration" of those
foreign nationals who were imprisoned despite violations of the
Vienna Convention.1 72 The remedy the United States deemed
to be the best suited to achieve the proper "review and reconsid-
eration," called for by the ICJ in LaGrand, was that of executive
clemency. 173 The United States held that clemency proceedings
provided a more flexible review process than that of the courts
because the doctrine of procedural default did not apply,' 74
thereby avoiding the Supreme Court decision in Breard.175
Clemency is a power that rests solely with the chief execu-
tive of the state. Since the power to grant or deny clemency
resides in the governor alone, the chief executive can use this
power as he or she wishes. This power has been used to com-
167 Id. at 995.
168 See id.
169 See id. at 994 (noting that the United States should abide by the Vienna
Convention and that a continued failure to do so may result in other countries not
respecting the treaty, and thus would not notify the United States consulate when
an American citizen is arrested in a foreign country).
170 Id. ("If the Vienna Convention does not expressly provide for a remedy,
however, it is not the proper role of this Court to 'connect the dots' and thus create
one.").
171 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3.
172 See id. at 128(7).
173 See Avena Order, 2003 I.C.J. 2 $ 44.
174 See id. 91 37.
175 See Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (stating that the doctrine of procedural
default applies to claims of violations of the Vienna Convention).
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mute the sentence of one inmate 176 as well as to commute the
sentence of every inmate on death row. 177 Such a sweeping ac-
tion was done by Illinois Governor George Ryan, who, on Janu-
ary 11, 2003, granted all 164 prisoners on death row executive
clemency, thus commuting their death sentences to life impris-
onment. 178 Governor Ryan declared that the state's capital
punishment system was not only "haunted by the demon of er-
ror," but was "arbitrary and capricious" 179 as well. Although ex-
ecutive clemency has been used to prevent unjust executions,
since it is under the control of only one person, the decision to
grant or deny clemency is very subjective and can be easily
abused. Even the state parole board, which makes recommen-
dations to the governor on whether or not to grant or deny clem-
ency, cannot overrule the governor's final decision. 80
Furthermore, the governor can decide to deny clemency, even
after the parole board has recommended granting it. 181
Such was the case with Gerardo Valdez, a Mexican national
who was sentenced to death in Oklahoma for "First Degree Mal-
ice Aforethought Murder." 8 2 Valdez, like so many others
before him, was not notified of his rights under the Vienna Con-
vention.'8 3 Moreover, Mexico was not notified of Valdez's status
until April of 2001,184 only a few weeks before his scheduled ex-
ecution. 8 5 In response, the Mexican consulate retained ex-
perts, gathered evidence and argued at a clemency hearing that
Valdez suffered from several conditions that greatly attributed
176 See No Justice in Rights Denied, supra note 123 (Oklahoma Governor Brad
Henry commuted the sentence of Osvaldo Torres to life imprisonment without
parole).
177 See Possley & Mills, supra note 102; see also Press Release 2003/9bis, supra
note 102 (Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted the sentence of all 164 death
row inmates).
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See Valdez v. Oklahoma, 2002 OK CR 20, 46 P.3d 703, 706 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2002).
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See id. at 705.
184 See id. (the only reason Mexico learned of Valdez's execution was because
one of his relatives contacted the Mexican consulate).
185 See id. at 704 (Valdez was originally scheduled to be executed on June 19,
2001).
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to his actions.18 6 On June 6, 2001, the Oklahoma Board of Par-
dons and Paroles voted 3-1 to commute Valdez's sentence to life
in prison without the possibility of parole.18 7 Consequently,
Governor Frank Keating granted a thirty day stay of the execu-
tion in order to decide whether or not to grant clemency.1 8
However, despite granting the stay, the governor denied grant-
ing executive clemency for Valdez on July 20, 2001, notwith-
standing a personal appeal from Mexican President Vicente
Fox. 8 9 Although the governor admitted to a violation of the Vi-
enna Convention, he stated that the violation was not prejudi-
cial and would not have affected the sentence Valdez
received. 190 Valdez was scheduled to be executed on August 30,
2001.191 Through a series of motions, Valdez was able to stay
his execution until the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
could make a final determination on the matter.1 92 Valdez at-
tempted to rely on the ICJ decision in LaGrand, in which the
International Court held that the procedural default cannot
prevent review of Article 36 claims.1 93 The court rejected
this, 94 stating that the 1998 Supreme Court decision, Breard v.
Greene, established that the rules of procedural default applied
to the Vienna Convention. 95 Despite rejecting Valdez's claim
186 See id. at 706 ("Valdez suffered from organic brain damage, was born into
extreme poverty, received limited education and grew up in a household plagued
by alcohol abuse and instability.").
187 See id.; see also Valdez Case Results in Life Sentence, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
Nov. 16, 2003, reprinted in Foreign Nationals: Current Issues and News, available
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=579.
188 See Valdez, 46 P.3d at 704.
189 See id; see also Oklahoma Governor Grants Temporary Reprieve For Mexi-
can National, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 2001, reprinted in Foreign Nationals: Current
Issues and News, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgarticle.php?scid=31
&did=579.
190 See Valdez, 46 P.3d at 706; see also United States of America: A Time for
Action - Protecting the Consular Rights of Foreign Nationals Facing the Death
Penalty, Aug. 22, 2001, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr511062001
(The governor described the consular rights violation as "regrettable and inexcus-
able" but dismissed it as resulting in "harmless errors." He further stated that
granting clemency would be an "inappropriate remedy in this case.").
191 See Valdez, 46 P.3d at 704.
192 See id. at 704-05.
193 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3; see also Valdez, 46 P.3d at 707-09.
194 See Valdez, 46 P.3d at 707-09 (holding that "[t]he legal basis for the claim is
not new and was available at the time of Petitioner's first Application for
Post-Conviction Relief regardless of the ICJ's decision in LaGrand").
195 See id. at 709 (citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
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of a violation of the Vienna Convention, 196 the court granted re-
lief in the form of re-sentencing based on the grounds that
Valdez was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assis-
tance of counsel.197
Since the governor denied him executive clemency despite
the Oklahoma Parole Board recommendation, Gerardo Valdez
was fortunate that the court found another avenue for relief.
Other foreign nationals, such as Angel Breard and Walter
LaGrand were not so fortunate. 98 These two foreign nationals,
like Valdez, were procedurally barred from bringing their Vi-
enna Convention claims.' 99 Similar to Valdez, they were denied
clemency by their respective governors,200 however, for Breard
and LaGrand, no alternate remedy was available. The denial of
clemency by the governor in the Valdez case and the actions
taken by Illinois Governor Ryan are illustrations of how subjec-
tive the decision to grant clemency can be. Such a subjective
and single-handed decision is why the "the standardless, secre-
tive and unreviewable process that is called clemency"20' is not
"a meaningful remedy at law,"20 2 for violations of the Vienna
convention.
IV. CURRENT POLICY
In addition to requesting that the United States provide
remedies for violations of the Vienna Convention, Paraguay,
Germany and Mexico have all demanded, in their respective
cases before the ICJ, that the United States provide a "guaran-
196 See id. ("For this Court to decide the ICJ's ruling overrules a binding deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court and affords a judicial remedy to an indi-
vidual for a violation of the Convention would interfere with the nation's foreign
affairs and run afoul of the U.S. Constitution.").
197 See id. at 710-11; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
198 Both Governor Jim Gilmore of Virginia and Governor Jane Dee Hull of Ari-
zona declined to exercise the power of executive clemency over Breard and
LaGrand. See Charney & Reisman, supra note 24; WESTERMAN, supra note 67.
199 See Greene, 523 U.S. at 375 (for Angel Breard); LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F.
Supp. 451, 454 (D. Ariz. 1995) (for Walter LaGrand).
200 See Charney & Reisman, supra note 24; WESTERMAN, supra note 67;
LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 (in fact, like Valdez, Arizona Governor Jane Dee Hull went
against the recommendation of the Arizona Parole Board and denied Walter
LaGrand clemency).
201 Avena Application, 2003 I.C.J. 45.
202 See id. 281(3).
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tee of the non-repetition of the illegal acts."203 Through the ef-
forts of its executive agencies the United States has attempted,
but has ultimately failed, to comply with these international
demands.204
After Angel Breard was convicted of murder in 1993,205 it
took three years before the Paraguayan consular authorities
learned of Breard's situation.20 6 The United States Department
of State undertook an investigation to determine why it took so
long for Paraguay to receive notification about one of its citi-
zens' legal plight. 20 7 The investigation revealed one possible ex-
planation as to why Paraguay was not notified of Breard's
arrest or conviction. Angel Breard spoke English fluently and
had lived in America for seven years prior to his arrest.20 8
Breard was familiar with American customs and culture.
Therefore, the arresting officers may have assumed that Breard
was an American citizen due to his command of the English lan-
guage. Additionally, the investigation led to other findings
which showed why notification of Paraguay may have been ir-
relevant. One such finding was that even though Breard him-
self did not contact the consulate, he had continuous contact
with his family. 209 Therefore, any member of his family could
have notified the Paraguayan consulate at his request. Breard
also had criminal defense attorneys who were experienced in
death penalty cases and could most likely explain to him the
American legal system better than a Paraguayan consular of-
ficer.2 10 Lastly, notification of the Paraguayan consulate would
have been irrelevant because there was overwhelming evidence
implicating Angel Breard in the attempted rape and murder of
203 LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 10(4); see Paraguay Order, 1998 I.C.J. 1 f 5(3);
Avena Order, 2003 I.C.J. 8(4).
204 Since the inception of the Vienna Convention, the United States Depart-
ment of Justice has had regulations in place to ensure that all foreign nationals
arrested by members of the federal government receive their Article 36 rights.
These regulations do not apply to state officials. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2004).
205 See Breard v. Virginia, 445 S.E.2d 670, 674 (Va. 1994).
206 See Paraguay Application, 1998 I.C.J. 12.
207 See GAYL WESTERMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PER-
SPECTIVE 105 (Foundation Press 2004) (using Jonathan I. Charney & W. Michael
Reisman, AGORA: BREARD: The Facts, 92 A.J.I.L. 666 (Oct. 1998)).
208 See id.
209 See id.
210 See id. at 105-06.
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Ruth Dickie. 211 Despite coming to the conclusion that notifica-
tion was unnecessary, the State Department did admit that a
violation of the Vienna Convention took place and apologized to
Paraguay. 212
In the LaGrand case before the ICJ, the United States noti-
fied Germany and the court that it made "'substantial measures
... aimed at preventing any recurrence' of a breach of Article
36 .... ,,213 They went on to claim that the U.S. State Depart-
ment was working on ways to improve compliance with the Vi-
enna Convention throughout the United States, thus
attempting to halt future violations.21 4 Such efforts, in January
1998, included the publication of booklets, brochures and pocket
parts all instructing law enforcement officials on the issues
dealing with consular notification. 215 This material was to be
delivered to the Attorney General of each state for further dis-
tribution. 216 Despite such promises, the United States contin-
ued to ignore decisions of the ICJ as well as the Vienna
Convention. 217 Two years later, Mexico's suit in the ICJ reiter-
211 See id. at 106.
212 See id.
213 LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 121; see also GAYL WESTERMAN ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 118-19 (Foundation Press 2004) (using
Letter from Mark Richards, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Charles D. Sie-
gal, Mar. 24, 1998; Letter from Department of State David R. Andrews, to Charles
D. Siegal).
214 See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 121.
215 The booklet is entitled "Consular Notification and Access: Instructions for
Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign
Nationals in the United States and the Rights of Consular Officials to Assist
Them." Furthermore, over 60,000 copies of a similar brochure as well as 400,000
pocket parts have been distributed to federal, state and local law enforcement offi-
cials. The State Department has continuously conducted training programs as
well as created an office and the position of Legal Advisor on Consular Affairs
within the State Department to handle issues dealing with the Vienna Conven-
tion. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 3 121; see also United States Dept. of State, http:/
/travel.state.gov/law/notify.html; see also State Department Changes its Tune, Apr.
1998, reprinted in Foreign Nationals: Current Issues and News, available at http:ll
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=579.
216 See State Department Changes its Tune, Apr. 1998, reprinted in Foreign
Nationals: Current Issues and News, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/article.php?scid=31&did=579.
217 See Consular Rights, Foreign Nationals and the Death Penalty, supra note
95; Aceves, supra note 97; Foreign Nationals Part H, supra note 98; Mexican Offi-
cials Claim Execution of Foreign National is Illegal, supra note 98; Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Avena Order 2003 I.C.J. 2; Avena Application, 2003 I.C.J.
128.
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ated the complaints of Germany and Paraguay, once again ask-
ing for America to comply with Article 36.218
These repeated claims before the ICJ against the United
States are evidence that the policy of giving arresting authori-
ties the responsibility of notifying foreign nationals of their Ar-
ticle 36 rights is an ineffective solution to halting Article 36
violations. This is because the policy is inconsistently enforced.
For example, the booklet created by the State Department and
given out to federal, state and local law enforcement does not
require that law enforcement officials ask every detainee
whether they are a U.S. citizen.219 It merely suggests that if
the official has reason to question the detainee's nationality,
they should inquire further.220 Also, even after the arresting
authorities learn of the detainee's foreign citizenship, they
sometimes neglect to tell either the detainee or the foreign con-
sulate. This was mentioned by Justice Breyer in his dissent in
Federal Republic of Germany v. United States.221  Justice
Breyer stated that the Arizona officials knew that the LaGrand
brothers were of German nationality, yet they chose not to in-
form either the defendants of their Article 36 rights or Germany
of the situation of its two citizens. 222 A more effective way of
eliminating violations of the Vienna Convention would be to
leave the responsibility of informing the foreign national of his
or her rights with the judiciary branch.
V. ALTERNATE SOLUTION
A remedy by the judiciary branch could come in a variety of
forms. One would be in the form of a U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion,223 holding that the Vienna Convention creates individu-
ally enforceable rights, and creates a "meaningful remedy at
218 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2004).
219 See Consular Notification and Access: Instructions for Federal, State and
Local Law Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the
United States and the Rights of Consular Officials to Assist Them, 18, available at
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/CNA-book.pdf.
220 See id.
221 Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
222 See Federal Republic of Germany, 526 U.S. at 113.
223 See Sarah M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure
U.S. Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 1729, 1769-71 (2003).
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law."22 4 However, a different, and a simple solution in the fed-
eral courts would be to amend Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.225 Under Rule 5, if a defendant is charged
with a felony, the judge must inform the defendant of the
charge against him,226 his right to retain counsel, 227 any cir-
cumstances under which the defendant may obtain pretrial re-
lease, 228 the right to a preliminary hearing229 and the
defendant's right to remain silent. 230 This paper proposes that
this rule should be amended so that the judge must notify the
defendant that he or she has the right to obtain consular assis-
tance in accordance with the Vienna Convention. Similar to a
Miranda warning,23 1 judicial notification of a defendant's right
to notify his or her consulate would be a blanket rule, applicable
to every prisoner that appeared before a judge.
An amendment to Rule 5 would be relatively simple and it
would not involve an overhaul of the entire federal criminal sys-
tem. Instead, the only modification to the current federal crimi-
nal system would be to require federal judges, during the
defendant's initial appearance in court, to educate defendants
during their initial court appearance of their right to notify
their consulate of his or her detention.
A change from law enforcement notification to judicial noti-
fication would also help the United States gain credibility
throughout the world as a nation that respects international
law. Due to this policy's universal application, it would signifi-
cantly reduce, or even eliminate all violations of the Vienna
Convention from occurring. Such a policy would be more effec-
tive than current enforcement, which leaves the decision to no-
224 See Avena Application, 2003 I.C.J. 281(3).
225 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.
226 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(1)(A).
227 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(1)(B).
228 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(1)(C).
229 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(1)(D).
230 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)(1)(E).
231 The doctrine that a criminal suspect in police custody must be informed of
certain constitutional rights before being interrogated. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); see also Avena, 2004
I.C.J. 12 64; see also Miranda Offers Simple Fix to Consular Rights Problem,
AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 10, 2004, reprinted in Recent Editorials on the
March 2004 Decision by the International Court of Justice, http://deathpenaltyinfo.
org/article.php?scid=31&did=955.
2006]
27
PACE INT'L L. REV.
tify the detainee of his or her rights under Article 36 up to the
subjective determination of a law enforcement agent. Further-
more, as many newspapers have noted, in the wake of the
Avena decision by the ICJ,232 if the United States constantly
fails to provide foreigners with access to their consulate, it is
possible that foreign governments will reciprocate by ignoring
the treaty when Americans are arrested abroad.23 3 Therefore,
it is important that the United States adhere to international
law, so that Americans abroad can be protected.
An amendment to Rule 5 would also prevent situations,
such as the one mentioned in the Avena case, from re-occur-
ring.234 In Avena, Mexico argued that the United States failed
to notify its citizens of their rights under the Vienna Conven-
tion.235 The United States responded that it is difficult to deter-
mine who is and who is not a U.S. citizen because America is a
multi-ethnic nation with much diversity.236 Additionally, since
citizenship is generously granted in America, unfamiliarity
with the English language may not be entirely reliable when
determining whether or not a person is an American citizen.237
Therefore, the arresting officers cannot be sure who they should
notify and who need not be notified of their consular rights.
This is further evidence of why an amendment to Rule 5 would
be a more effective policy than the current policy. If all detain-
ees who were brought before a judge were notified of their possi-
ble rights under the Vienna Convention, then the confusion
admitted to by the United States in Avena would not have
occurred.
232 See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12.
233 See What Goes Around, BALT. SuN, Apr. 2, 2004, at A14; No Justice in
Rights Denied, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2004, at B20; Our Opinion: Compliance with
Hague Ruling Protects Americans Abroad, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 4, 2004, at 4L; For-
eigners on Death Row, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 5, 2004; Keeping Your Word -
Texas Can't Afford to Ignore Federal Treaties, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 12,
2004, at A14; Miranda Offers Simple Fix to Consular Rights Problem, AuSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 16, 2004, all reprinted in Recent Editorials on the
March 2004 Decision by the International Court of Justice, http://deathpenaltyinfo.
org/article.php?scid=31&did=955.
234 See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12.
235 See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 12 12(1).
236 See id. 64.
237 See id. at I 63-4.
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In addition, a universal policy would be beneficial because
every country has its own distinct laws on citizenship 238 and the
method adopted by the State Department cannot guarantee
that violations of the Vienna Convention will not occur. For ex-
ample, Karl and Walter LaGrand were German nationals even
though they moved to the United States when they were very
young.239 Due to moving at a young age, the boys adopted the
American culture and language. 240 Neither brother spoke Ger-
man.241 Therefore, when arrested, the Arizona law enforce-
ment had no suspicion that the brothers were either German
citizens or that the Vienna Convention even applied.242 It is for
reasons such as this, that the current policy must be changed so
that those who appear to be American citizens, but are not, do
not lose their Article 36 rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a signatory to the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, the United States should abide by the international
treaty. The United States has attempted to comply with the
Convention in various ways. However, each method of compli-
ance has proven ineffective. In the courts, the doctrine of proce-
dural default has limited the review of Article 36 claims.
Further, executive clemency has proven to be too arbitrary of a
decision to provide full compliance. In addition, the current pol-
icy of law enforcement notification is not effective in preventing
future violations of the Vienna Convention. Therefore, the
United States must create a new policy of judicial notification
by amending Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 5. With
such an amendment, the United States could comply with Arti-
cle 36 and rid itself of any international problems associated
with violating the Vienna Convention.
238 See United States Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service,
Citizenship Laws of the World, http://www.opm.gov/extra/investigate/IS-01.pdf.
239 See GAYL WESTERMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PER-
SPECTIVE 125-26 (Foundation Press 2004).
240 See id.
241 See id.
242 See id.
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